All systems are operational

Past Incidents

Monday 5th July 2021

NemID Legacy version of NemID experiencing issues.
Monday 5th July 2021 09:30 UTC

The legacy version of NemID is experiencing issues (this is the version where the recipient can select between signing with CPR or CVR). We are investigating to find a fix for this as soon as possible. Meanwhile it is possible to work around this by changing authentication method to NemID CPR, NemID CVR or NemID PID. This can be done via the API or for an ongoing journey in the e-archive by opening the document and clicking on the affected party > Authentication to sign > Change.

  • The issue is now resolved, pardon any inconvenience.

    Monday 5th July 2021 12:44 UTC

    • Wednesday 26th May 2021

    Norwegian BankID Sudden certificate change for Norwegian BankID
    Wednesday 26th May 2021 10:06 UTC

    Our provider of Norwegian BankID have changed configuration of certificates on their end causing many transactions to fail.

  • A new certificate has, after som delay at Nordea, been issued and credentials have been exchanged. Norwegian BankID is once again operational.

    Wednesday 26th May 2021 11:11 UTC

  • The cause was Nordea (the issuer of the Scrive certificate) invalidating the currently used certificate without prior information to Scrive and without informing or sending a new certificate to either Scrive or Vipps. We are working on obtaining a functioning certificate and matching the configuration on the Scrive side.

    Wednesday 26th May 2021 10:09 UTC

    • Tuesday 4th May 2021

    Core eID service Spike in document creation
    Tuesday 4th May 2021 08:22 UTC

    The service is once again returning code 502 and is partially unavailable.

  • It has been determined that this performance issue was caused by a number of integrations and users trying to recreate work stopped by the previous incident allt at once. Load levels are back to normal.

    Tuesday 4th May 2021 09:07 UTC

  • The traffic spike receded. The incident team is watching the system closely. Spikes come and go.

    Tuesday 4th May 2021 08:31 UTC

    • Monday 3rd May 2021

    Core eSign Service Partial outage for core service
    Monday 3rd May 2021 11:24 UTC

    We are investigating an issue where the core s-signing service is not responding properly to all requests and instead gives an error.

    Update: the service is now not responding to requests at all.

    Update: we are partially up again. We intend to keep parts of the service down to fault isolate, but will prioritise allowing signatories to sign.

    Update: Database server capacity is being increased. The root cause of issues has still not been found.

    Update: New database server is up. We still see usage peaking to maximum.

    Update: we were briefly up but load increases quickly. Next item to isolate the error is to disconnect application servers from the load balancers. This will cause the service to be completely out of commission for the duration.

  • We have rolled back the service one version. More information will come separately.

    Tuesday 4th May 2021 06:23 UTC

  • The core e-signing service is not responding properly to all requests. We are investigating the cause of the issue.

    Tuesday 4th May 2021 05:49 UTC

  • Validating database fix.

    Monday 3rd May 2021 19:00 UTC

  • The problem is now likely identified: a corrupted database index and it is being recreated. It is not possible to estimate the time needed for this operation.

    Monday 3rd May 2021 18:14 UTC

  • Hardware error has been ruled out after replacing the database. The investigation continues.

    Monday 3rd May 2021 17:10 UTC

  • We currently suspect a block storage hardware failure, since the production environment is not behaving like the testing environment for specific database queries.

    Monday 3rd May 2021 16:07 UTC

  • The team is still investigating a spike in usage of the database.

    Monday 3rd May 2021 15:25 UTC

  • Update: we were briefly up but load increases quickly. Next item to isolate the error is to disconnect application servers from the load balancers. This will cause the service to be completely out of commission for the duration.

    (Please see previous updates in the original status notification. Future updates will trigger notifications.)

    Monday 3rd May 2021 14:46 UTC